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 II. AIR AND ATMOSPHERE 
 
 





On 12 December 2015, the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted the “Paris Agreement”. Paris 
thus finally concluded the long process of crafting a new international climate regime that 
began with the adoption of the Bali Roadmap in 2007, failed spectacularly in Copenhagen 
2009, and resumed with a new approach in Durban 2011. This article summarises and 
analyses the main contents of the Paris Agreement. 
 
 
(2) Legal Form – Treaty or Not? 
 
The Paris outcome consists of two parts: the Paris Agreement, and the COP decision which 
adopts the agreement and sets out steps to be taken in the next years until the agreement enters 
into force (Decision 1/CP.21, Advance Version, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, 29 January 2016). 
The ‘natural’ legal form of the Paris Agreement would have taken the shape of a protocol like 
the Kyoto Protocol, as provided for in Article 17 of the UNFCCC. This, however, would have 
forced the US administration to submit the protocol to the Senate for ratification – and given 
current domestic US politics Senate ratification would have been impossible to achieve. The 
Parties in Paris thus chose a legal form that is not provided for in the UNFCCC because it is 
neither an amendment to the convention nor a protocol. This innovative legal approach 
immediately sparked a discussion in the US whether the Paris Agreement is a treaty and 
whether it has to be submitted to the Senate for ratification.  
In public international law, a treaty is defined by Art. 2.1 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties as meaning “an international agreement concluded between States in 
written form and governed by international law”. The Paris Agreement was certainly 
concluded between states and in written form, and since it uses the bodies and procedures 
developed in the context of the Convention (undoubtedly an international treaty) it may safely 
be concluded that it is governed by international law.  
Inside the US legal system, the executive may conclude “treaties” and “international 
agreements other than treaties”. The former need a two-thirds majority in the Senate for 
ratification, whereas a president may conclude “international agreements other than treaties” 
on his own in three cases: pursuant to a treaty authorized by the Senate, on the basis of 
existing legislation, and pursuant to his authority as chief executive when such an agreement 
is not inconsistent with legislation enacted by Congress (Foreign Affairs Manual - Chapter 
700 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, 
http://www.state.gov/e/oes/rls/rpts/175/1319.htm). Since the Paris Agreement has been 
adopted pursuant to the UNFCCC, which has been ratified by the Senate, and does not impose 
new substantive obligations upon the USA (as will be detailed in the following), it may be 
considered an “international agreement other than a treaty” under US law and thus not require 




(3) Differentiation: An Agreement Applicable to All 
 
While the Durban mandate was to negotiate a new climate agreement “applicable to all”, the 
negotiations continued to be as dominated by disagreements over the respective roles of the 
so-called “developed” countries (listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC) and “developing” 
countries as they have always been. While the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol have 
imposed obligations on Annex I countries, no such obligations have so far existed for non-
Annex I countries. In particular the group of like-minded developing countries (LMDCs), 
which includes China, India, other Asian countries, oil-exporting Arab countries such as 
Saudi Arabia and leftist Latin American countries such as Bolivia, strongly resisted any 
explicit or implicit dissolution of the traditional distinction between the Annexes. 
The 2013 conference in Warsaw largely resolved this issue by creating the concept of 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). Using the term “contributions” 
instead of “commitments” accommodated the position of the LMDCs that there should be no 
binding commitments for developing countries – as well as the US desire to avoid 
commitments. On the other side, developed countries prevented creating any differentiation 
between themselves and non-Annex I countries regarding the legal nature of participation in 
the new agreement 
Differentiation between the two blocks is still present in the new agreement, but in much 
more attenuated form than previously. Most provisions establish common obligations for all 
countries, but require developed countries to continue taking the lead while expecting 




(4) Purpose of the Agreement 
 
In 2010, at COP16 in Cancún, Parties had agreed to keep global temperature increase below 2 
°C compared to pre-industrial levels. However, this had only been a COP decision, the 
question was therefore whether it would be possible to enshrine this temperature limit in the 
treaty that was to come out of Paris. In addition, small island developing states (SIDS) and the 
least developed countries (LDCs) had long argued that 2°C was too weak a limit for them, 
with the associated sea-level rise and other impacts threatening the mere survival of some of 
their members. They had therefore long pushed for strengthening the limit to 1.5 °C, but until 
Paris the push for 1.5 °C had found little favour with the large emitters – the ones who would 
need to undertake the necessary emission reductions.  
Art. 2.1 of the final agreement includes as objective to hold the increase in the global average 
temperature to “well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels” and adds an aspirational goal “to 
pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels”. In 
addition, the agreements sets objectives to increase “the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts 
of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions 
development, in a manner that does not threaten food production, and to make “finance flows 
consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient 
development”. All these objectives are set in the context of sustainable development and 
efforts to eradicate poverty. The latter is an acknowledgement of developing countries 




(5) Individual Efforts 
 
On countries’ contributions, in particular the LMDCs demanded that industrialised countries 
should adopt legally binding economy-wide emission targets without any conditions attached 
while mitigation contributions by developing countries should continue to be voluntary, 
diverse in nature and conditional on the provision of support by industrialised countries. On 
the other side, developed countries demanded that all major economies should adopt 
economy-wide targets. The USA suggested that while all countries should be legally bound to 
provide contributions under the new agreement, the content of the contributions should not be 
legally binding.  
Art. 4 of the final agreement commits each Party to “prepare, communicate and maintain 
successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve.” In addition, “Parties 
shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such 
contributions.” The Paris Agreement thus establishes legally binding obligations to notify a 
contribution and to take domestic measures in pursuit of achieving the contribution, but it 
does not establish an obligation for countries to actually achieve their contributions.  
Differentiation is addressed by the provision that developed countries “should continue taking 
the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets” while developing 
countries “are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or 
limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances.” (Art. 4.3) Furthermore, 
support “shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of this Article 
(…) recognizing that enhanced support for developing country Parties will allow for higher 
ambition in their actions.” (Art. 4.5)  
Further guidance on features of contributions is to be developed in the coming years, as is 
further guidance information requirements for the submission of contributions (Decision 
1/CP.21, paras 26-28). 
 
 
(6) Global and Individual Mitigation Ambition 
 
On mitigation, a key discussion revolved around whether to adopt a global long-term 
emission target or other types of targets in order to turn the temperature limit into a more 
concrete goal. The 2015 G7 meeting had called for a “decarbonisation of the global economy 
over the course of this century“ and supported setting a global emission target at “the upper 
end of the latest IPCC recommendation of 40 to 70 % reductions by 2050 compared to 2010” 
(Leadersʼ Declaration G7 Summit Germany, 7-8 June 2015, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/g8/g7_germany_declaration-
g7_allemagne_declaration.aspx?lang=eng). In the climate negotiations, SIDS and the LDCs 
called for global emission reductions of at least 70-90% by 2050. By contrast, in particular 
Arab and other oil exporting countries opposed including any language on decarbonisation or 
emission neutrality. 
In the last negotiation hours Parties agreed on compromise language to “aim to reach global 
peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take 
longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in 
accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this 
century, on the basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to 
eradicate poverty.“ (Art. 4.1)   
Since almost all of the INDCs had been communicated before COP21, the projected impact 
on emissions was well known before the conference started – and it falls far short of what is 
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needed to keep temperature increase below the agreed limit. The Parties acknowledge this 
shortfall from the agreed temperature limit in the decision adopting the agreement, which 
“notes with concern” that the contributions do not fall within least-cost 2 °C scenarios, which 
envisage emissions of around 40 gigatonnes in 2030, but instead lead to a projected level of 
55 gigatonnes (Decision 1/CP.21, para 17). 
The effectiveness of the Paris Agreement in limiting global warming therefore depends on the 
quick strengthening of national contributions (see section 10). 
 
 
(7) Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD+) 
 
Deforestation and forest degradation activities are a major source of GHG emissions, being 
responsible for more than ten per cent of the global GHG emissions. The focus of the 
negotiations in Paris was on the role REDD+ would have post-2020: Would REDD+ be 
explicitly mentioned in the agreement text, and if yes, what message would the respective 
section convey?  The final agreement does contain an article (Art. 5) that is exclusively 
devoted to REDD+, but it does not install a new REDD+ mechanism. Instead, it builds on the 
Warsaw Framework for REDD+ established by a series of COP decisions in 2013 and has 
rather weak wording. Parties “are encouraged to take action to implement and support […] the 
existing [REDD+] framework”. However, the relevance of the concept is underscored with its 
explicit mention in the finance section of the COP Decision adopting the Paris Agreement, 
which contains a paragraph that stresses the importance of providing financial resources for 
REDD+ activities (Decision 1/CP.21, para 54).  
 
 
(8) Cooperative Mechanisms 
 
While the EU and others pushed strongly for the inclusion of emission trading mechanisms in 
the Paris Agreement, leftist Latin American governments strongly resisted the inclusion of 
such mechanisms. To accommodate these countries, the final outcome makes no explicit 
mention of markets, but enables market-based approaches in several ways. One distinct 
feature is a new mechanism established in Art. 6.4, which is to ”promote the mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions while fostering sustainable development”. While building on the 
experiences of the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, the scope of this mechanism is 
broader in that it is not restricted to project-type activities. Furthermore, it is to ”deliver an 
overall mitigation in global emissions”, thus going beyond the zero-sum game of the Kyoto 
Mechanisms to date. The deviation from the Kyoto world is also mirrored in the fact that both 
developed and developing countries can use the mechanisms, leading to a kind of hybrid 
between the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation, respectively. Detailed 
modalities and procedures are to be developed in the next years.  
Moreover, the Paris Agreement allows Parties to conduct “cooperative approaches.” Under 
these, mitigation outcomes can be “internationally transferred” and “used” against nationally 
determined contributions. UNFCCC oversight is not foreseen. Instead, the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement is to develop dedicated 
guidance (Art. 6.2f).  
Finally, to accommodate the countries that are critical of market mechanisms the Agreement 
also defines a “framework for non-market approaches to sustainable development” (Art. 6.9). 





With many developing countries already experiencing impacts of climate change, for many 
years, they have made efforts to raise the status of adaptation in the climate regime, which has 
historically been put in second place behind mitigation. The agreement recognises that 
adaptation “is a key component of and makes a contribution to the long-term global response 
to climate change to protect people, livelihoods and ecosystems” (Art. 7.2). Parties explicitly 
recognize that the “current need for adaptation is significant and that greater levels of 
mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts” (Art. 7.4), as well as the 
associated costs. The explicit link to the temperature goal is important as it acknowledges that 
global needs for adaptation highly depend on the success of mitigation activities. 
All Parties are requested to compile information on adaptation priorities, implementation and 
support needs in an adaptation communication which is to be recorded in a public registry 
maintained by the secretariat of the UNFCCC and updated periodically. Crucially, national 
adaptation communications will be part of the five-yearly global stocktake and contribution 
cycle (see section 12), thus offering opportunities to review the overall progress made in 
achieving the global goal on adaptation and to spiral up adaptation action and support. 
 
 
(10) Loss and Damage 
 
Loss and damage refers to adverse effects of climate change which cannot be adapted to. The 
concept has been a contentious issue of the climate change negotiations for many years. While 
developed countries have been afraid of liability claims and therefore tried to keep the issue 
on a low profile, developing countries, in particular LDCs as well as other particularly 
vulnerable countries, have been fighting strongly for its recognition as an independent third 
pillar of climate policy, complementary to mitigation and adaptation. A first step was made 
with the installation of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated 
with Climate Change Impacts (WIM) in 2013, but the question was whether loss and damage 
would be a part of the Paris Agreement. After intense negotiations, Art. 8 of the Paris 
Agreement was dedicated to loss and damage. With this, developing countries have achieved 
the formal recognition and strengthening of the concept. However, the US, with the support of 
other developed countries, managed to include a paragraph in the accompanying decision that 
rules out claims of compensation and liability in the context of loss and damage (Decision 
1/CP.21, para 51).  
Art. 8 of the Paris Agreement underscores the relevance of dealing with loss and damage and 
lists a total of eight areas of cooperation to enhance understanding, action and support 
including early warning systems, slow onset events and non-economic losses. The Paris 
Agreement does not create a new mechanism, as originally proposed by developing countries, 
but states that the Warsaw Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) is to operate under the 
governing body of the new agreement. It further states that the WIM “may be enhanced and 
strengthened” in the future and continued, following a review in 2016, as envisaged in the 
COP decision adopting the agreement (Decision 1/CP.21, paras 47ff).  
  
 
(11) Means of Implementation 
 
For developing countries to effectively implement their nationally determined contributions, 
industrialised countries will have to offer assistance in various forms, including finance, 
technology development and transfer, and capacity building. The basis for this obligation 
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reaches back as far as the original text of the Convention (UNFCCC Art. 4). Bearing in mind 
that especially finance and technology are "hard currency" not only in the climate realm, but 
have notable implications for country budgets, the history of the COPs has seen fights over 





On finance, a major point of contention was the demand of developed countries to broaden 
the donor base beyond the traditional industrialised countries, Developing countries for their 
part demanded that industrialised countries should provide a clear roadmap for how they 
intended to fulfil the pledge to scale up climate finance to USD 100 billion annually by 2020 
they made at COP15 in Copenhagen, as well as firm commitments to increase the level of 
funding after 2020. They also demanded establishment of an iterative finance cycle to 
regularly evaluate and upscale the provision of finance by developed countries.  
The final agreement in Art. 9 merely stipulates that, "Developed country Parties shall provide 
financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and 
adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention." (Art. 9.1) The 
Agreement also encourages other Parties to "provide or continue to provide such support 
voluntarily". This poses no additional binding obligation on developing countries, but 
recognises the growing level of South-South financial support and partly accommodates 
developed countries’ desire to broaden the donor base. 
In the decision adopting the agreement, Parties decided that, "developed countries intend to 
continue their existing collective mobilization goal through 2025 [...]; prior to 2025 the 
[Conference of the Parties meeting as Parties to the Agreement] shall set a new collective 
quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year..." (Decision 1/CP.21, para 53). 
While this language is again non-binding, with the second half of the paragraph it is now clear 
that the promised USD 100 billion per year cannot be the ceiling of finance commitment, but 
rather have to be a floor to scale up from before 2025. However, the formulation of a 
"collective quantified goal" will once more open up fights over financing commitments by at 
least the economically stronger developing countries. 
The decision also urges developed countries to develop a “concrete roadmap” for achieving 
the USD 100 billion pledge, and decides to conduct a facilitative dialogue at COP 22 in 2016 





Art. 10 of the Agreement establishes a “technology framework” in order to provide guidance 
to the Convention’s Technology Mechanism, which will now also serve the Paris Agreement. 
The technology framework also serves to pursue the long-term vision of all Parties set out in 
paragraph Art. 10.1, citing "the importance of fully realizing technology development and 
transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions." 
The technology framework is to be further defined in the next years. Topics that should be 
taken into account include undertaking and updating technology needs assessments (TNAs) of 
developing countries, scaling-up of technical and financial support for TNAs, assessing 
technologies that are "ready for transfer", and the enhancement of enabling environments as 
well as the removal of barriers to technology transfer (Decision 1/CP.21, para 67). 
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Another success of developing countries is the establishment of a clear link between 
technology and finance. As set out in Art. 10.5 of the Agreement, the acceleration, 
encouragement, and enablement of innovation is not only to be supported through the 
Technology Mechanism, but also through financial means by the Financial Mechanism of the 
Convention. This link to the Financial Mechanism had been a matter of debate between 
developing and developed countries for a long time. 
 
 
(C) Capacity Building 
 
Capacity building had in the past been a low-profile element of the UN climate regime's 
support structure. Consistent progress had been made over the last years, with the Durban 
Forum on Capacity-Building, a multi-stakeholder forum for sharing ideas and lessons learned, 
being the most visible outcome in 2011. 
The Paris Agreement recognizes the importance of the issue, but the text of the Agreement 
itself is relatively weak and non-binding. However, the accompanying decision text holds a 
negotiation success for developing countries: the Paris Committee on Capacity-building is 
created, with an aim to "address gaps and needs” of capacity-building in developing countries 
and to further enhance capacity-building efforts, including with regard to coherence and 
coordination in capacity-building activities under the Convention.” (Decision 1/CP.21, para 
71) The Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) is tasked to develop terms of reference for 
the newly-established body. 
 
 
(12) Three Elements for Increasing Ambition over Time 
 
Since the achievement of the contributions is not mandatory and their ambition does not 
match the agreed temperature limit (see sections 4 and 5), the Paris agreement relies on three 
elements that provide transparency and create political moments that impose a threat of high 
political costs for those Parties that do not keep up with their pledges: through periodic global 




(A) Global Stocktake and Contribution Cycle 
 
One of the central questions of the negotiation process was whether or not Parties’ 
contributions should be assessed internationally before adoption. In particular the LMDCs 
rejected any international assessment of developing countries’ intended contributions, citing 
reasons of sovereignty. Before Paris, there was therefore only a technical paper by the 
Secretariat assessing the global aggregate level of mitigation ambition of the INDCs, but no 
discussion of individual INDCs. A related question was the frequency of contribution cycles. 
Many INDCs have 2030 as target date, some have 2025, and some have yet other dates. The 
question was therefore whether and how quickly countries, in particular those with 2030 and 
later target dates, would need to reconsider their contributions in the next years.  
Agreement was made possible by broadening the scope of the cycle to include not only 
mitigation but also adaptation and provision of support. This meets the demand of the LMDCs 
that mitigation ambition and the provision of support need to be considered in tandem. Parties 
thus agreed that contributions shall be communicated every five years. A “global stocktake” 
of the implementation of the Agreement is to take place in 2023 and every five years 
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thereafter. The outcome of the stocktake is to “inform” Parties in updating and enhancing 
their actions and support (Art. 14). Furthermore, Parties agreed that each new contribution 
will “represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined 
contribution” (Art. 4.3). This is the core of a new and innovative mechanism: compulsory 
strengthening of contributions every five years. 
To jumpstart the five-year cycle, the accompanying COP decision provides for a “facilitative 
dialogue among Parties in 2018 to take stock of the collective efforts (...) and to inform the 
preparation of nationally determined contributions” (Decision 1/CP.21, para 20).  
 
 
(B) Transparency Framework 
 
So far, reporting and review provisions have differed substantially between developed and 
developing countries. Developed countries demanded to move towards a common framework 
that would generally be applicable to all, but with flexibility on the timing and detail in the 
reporting reflecting different capacities, and with support to developing countries. By 
contrast, many developing countries highlighted their low technical capacity and demanded to 
keep a clear differentiation between developed and developing countries.  
The final agreement makes no fundamental distinction between developed and developing 
countries and provides that all Parties shall account for their contributions (Art. 4.13). The 
agreement also establishes an “enhanced transparency framework for action and support, with 
built-in flexibility which takes into account Parties’ different capacities” (Art. 13.1). The aim 
of the framework for transparency of action is “to provide a clear understanding” of climate 
action including mitigation and adaptation, and to track progress. The aim of the framework 
for transparency of support is “to provide clarity on support provided and received”, and to as 
much as possible provide an overview of aggregate financial support. The transparency 
framework also is to inform the global stocktake (Art. 13.5f).  
The framework is to build on the existing reporting and review arrangements under the 
Convention and is to “be implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, 
respectful of national sovereignty, and avoid placing undue burden on Parties” (Art. 13.3). To 
support developing countries in complying with the Agreement’s transparency provisions, the 
implementing decision establishes a “Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency”, to be 
supported by the Global Environment Facility (Decision 1/CP.21,, paras 85-89). 
The information provided by Parties will be subject to a technical expert review. In addition, 
Parties shall participate in a “facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress”. The detailed 
modalities and procedures for the transparency framework are to be agreed in the following 
years (Art. 13.11-13.13).  
 
 
(C) Facilitative Compliance Mechanism 
 
Finally, Art. 15 of the Agreement establishes a “mechanism to facilitate implementation of 
and promote compliance with“ its provisions. The mandate of the compliance committee is 
described with the same language as the transparency framework, namely it shall be 
“facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-
punitive”, and “shall pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and 
circumstances of Parties”. Detailed modalities are to be developed, including the question 




(13) Increasing Short-term Ambition 
 
(A) Technical Examination Processes 
 
In Durban, developing countries had agreed to embark on the negotiation process for the Paris 
Agreement under the condition that a second stream of negotiations was initiated with the aim 
to increase the near-term (pre-2020) ambition of mitigation activities, particularly by 
developed countries. However, it quickly became apparent that the previously agreed 
emission reduction targets were hard-wired. Instead, the focus of the negotiations under 
Workstream 2 (WS2) shifted towards identifying policy options and technical solutions for 
implementation, rather than strengthening of headline targets. Furthermore, the process put a 
focus on non-party actors as agents of increased mitigation ambition. The hope has been that 
promoting action “on the ground” could lead to overachievement of the pledges, thus closing 
the ambition gap in actual terms.  
In 2014, Parties had engaged in constructive discussions in the form of technical expert 
meetings and agreed to extend this technical examination process (TEP) until 2020. In Paris, 
Parties agreed to give a very strong mandate to the UNFCCC Secretariat to organize the 
process and disseminate its results. The Secretariat shall organize focussed technical expert 
meetings; maintain a technical paper on mitigation benefits and wider sustainable 
development co-benefits of the presented mitigation activities, as well as options to support 
their implementation; and prepare on an annual basis a summary for policy makers with 
information on specific policies and practices and options for support for implementation 
(Decision 1/CP.21, paras 109f). 
Parties also agreed to establish a second TEP with respect to adaptation. The goal of the new 
TEP will be the identification of concrete opportunities for strengthening resilience, reducing 
vulnerabilities and increasing the understanding and implementation of adaptation actions. To 
support the TEP on adaptation, the secretariat is to organize regular technical expert meetings 
(TEMs) and to annually prepare a technical paper (Decision 1/CP.21, paras 124ff).  
 
 
(B) Lima - Paris Action Agenda  
 
The Lima-Paris Action Agenda was initiated one year before Paris, at COP20 in Lima. With 
this initiative, Peru and France as the presidencies of two successive COPs pursued the aim to 
link the myriad of activities by non-state actors with the diplomatic process. All in all, around 
700 major cities, regions, companies and investors from all continents promised to help 
implement the Paris Agreement and accelerate the transformative changes needed to meet the 
climate change challenge (L’Appel de Paris (Paris Pledge for Action): 
http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/paris-pledge/).  
In Paris, the Parties initiated a facilitative dialogue that will assess progress in the pre-2020 
implementation at the next COP. Each COP from 2016-2020 will furthermore be coupled 
with a high-level event. Two “high-level champions” will be appointed for overlapping two 
year terms. The champions are supposed to raise the ambition, to facilitate high-level 
engagement in the process and provide guidance to the Secretariat on behalf of the COP 





After 25 years of UN climate diplomacy, the world's governments have for the first time in 
history negotiated a treaty which envisages climate action by all nations. This concludes the 
decades-long struggle on the participation of the US and of developing countries in the 
climate regime and bridges the deep schism, the dichotomous division of the world into 
"industrialized" and "non-industrialized" states.  
Direction is provided by the long-term goal to keep global mean temperature rise "well below 
2 °C". The temperature limit is thus not only enshrined in international law, but also 
strengthened compared to the previous formulation from Cancún. Furthermore, the agreement 
contains the aim "to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-
industrial levels". Anchoring the 1.5 °C limit in the agreement is a negotiating victory of the 
most vulnerable countries, small island states and least developed countries that came as a 
surprise to most. 
Moreover, Paris marks a significant step forward in further operationalizing the 2 °C limit. 
Parties agreed that, firstly, greenhouse gas emissions need to peak “as soon as possible”, and, 
secondly, that "a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks 
of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century" (Art. 4). Given that it will probably not 
be possible to reduce emissions from agriculture and some industrial processes to zero, the 
available sink capacity will be needed to compensate for emissions from these sources, which 
means that all emissions that can be reduced to zero need to be reduced to zero. The long-term 
goal as formulated in the Paris Agreement is thus synonymous with a call to end fossil fuel 
use before the end of the century, much earlier even in developed countries.  
At the same time, the emission reductions countries have pledged under the Paris Agreement 
are widely out of step with its global targets. Furthermore, the Paris Agreement does not 
establish a legally binding obligation for countries to actually achieve their contributions. 
Instead, it relies on the instruments of ‘naming and shaming’ to ensure implementation. This 
is the price that needed to be paid to get the USA and the LMDCs on board.  
The next years will show whether the world community is willing to seriously tackle the 
challenges of a global transformation. The turn-around from the fossil-based development 
path is still possible, but requires immediate implementation and the strengthening of national 
contributions already from 2018.  
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